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The emergence of financial conglomerates and multinational financial institutions 
as well as the development of new financial products have raised concerns as to 
the ability of separate sectoral supervisors and different national authorities to 
effectively oversee financial markets. Concentrating on the European situation, 
this paper addresses these concerns by putting special emphasis on the role of 
organizational form in the supervisory process of financial institutions. I will first 
outline the developments that have led to increasing pressures to reform the 
current supervisory systems in Europe, proceed to discuss both some common and 
specific aspects of supervision of financial conglomerates and multinationals, and, 
finally, examine the challenges related to the integration of supervision. Using 
theoretical framework derived from economic theory, this paper points that 
multitude of factors (eg, several multitasking-related concerns) are likely to affect 
the effectiveness of integrated supervision. 
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Finanssivalvonnan yhdistäminen 
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Finanssiryhmittymien ja monikansallisten rahoituslaitosten yleistyminen yhdessä 
uudenlaisten rahoitustuotteiden kehittymisen kanssa on herättänyt huolta perintei-
sen eriytyneen finanssivalvontamallin sopivuudesta rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvon-
taan. Tässä keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan taloustieteellisestä näkökulmasta 
näiden kehitystrendien haasteita eurooppalaisen finanssivalvonnan kannalta. 
Alussa käsitellään lyhyesti valvontarakenteiden kehittämiseen ja uudistamiseen 
vaikuttavia kehitystrendejä. Tämän jälkeen tarkastellaan finanssiryhmittymien ja 
monikansallisten rahoituslaitosten valvontaan liittyviä yhteisiä näkökohtia ja 
erityiskysymyksiä. Lopuksi käsitellään sekä eriytyneen että integroidun finanssi-
valvontamallin haasteita. Johtopäätöksenä on, että taloustieteellisestä näkö-
kulmasta myös integroituun valvontamalliin liittyy haasteita, mikä johtuu 
erityisesti useiden eri tehtävien allokoitumisesta yhdelle valvontaviranomaiselle. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssivalvonta, finanssiryhmittymät, monikansalliset rahoituslaitok-
set, valvonnan integrointi, valvonta 
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6 1 Executive summary
The emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinational ﬁnancial
institutions as well as the development of new ﬁnancial products have raised
concerns as to the ability of separate sectoral supervisors and diﬀerent
national authorities to eﬀectively oversee ﬁnancial markets. Concentrating
on the European situation, this paper addresses these concerns by using a
framework based on economic literature. Special emphasis is put on the role
of organizational structure since, both in the case of ﬁnancial conglomerates
and multinationals, the institution’s corporate structure plays a role in the
emergence of some key supervisory concerns.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 3 outlines
the developments (conglomeration, cross-border consolidation, increasing
popularity of integrated supervision) that have led to growing pressures to
reform some of the current supervisory systems in Europe.
Section 4 contains three subsections. Section 4.1 discusses the dimensions
(prudential, conduct-of-business, macroprudential) of oﬃcial supervision,
the powers of oﬃcial supervisors as well as the relationship between
oﬃcial and private supervision (including some implications of Basel
II on market discipline). Section 4.2 introduces the three layers of
prudential supervision (solo supervision of regulated entities, consolidated
supervision of homogeneous ﬁnancial services groups and supplementary
supervision of heterogeneous groups) that can all be present in the
supervision of a ﬁnancial conglomerate, and discusses the alternative
corporate structures of ﬁnancial conglomerates (fully-integrated, partially
integrated, parent-subsidiary, holding-company model). Based on the model
of Freixas, Loranth and Morrison (2006), the section also discusses how the
holding-company structure can give rise to regulatory arbitrage and how
capital requirements can be used to take advantage of diﬀerences in market
discipline and, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, to encourage regulatory
arbitrage. Section 4.3 introduces the organizational forms for cross-border
banking (correspondent banking, representative oﬃces, agencies, branches,
subsidiaries) and discusses how branches and subsidiaries diﬀer in terms of
their authorization process and how these diﬀerences aﬀect the allocation of
supervisory responsibility between the home and host country supervisors.
Based on the model of Holthausen and Rønde (2005), this section also discusses
how the interaction between self-interested national supervisors may lead to
non-disclosure of supervisory information and distortions in closure decisions
of ﬁnancial institutions.
Section 5 discusses the integration of sectoral supervisors by ﬁrst
introducing the two alternative forms of cross-sectoral supervision (functional
model with separate supervisors for the prudential supervision and the conduct
of business supervision across the sectors, integrated model with a single
supervisor for banking, insurance and securities combined) and then addresses
the potential beneﬁts of integrated supervision (eg, comprehensiveness of
supervision and diﬀerent types of economies of scale and scope) as well as
the alternative means to facilitate cooperation and coordination in supervision
without establishing an integrated supervisory authority. Subsections 5.1 and
75.2 discuss the challenges of integrated supervision. Since as a by-product of
integration a plurality of tasks gets allocated to a single authority, Section
5.1 outlines the multitasking-based challenges (eg, potentially conﬂicting
tasks, challenges for incentive provision, thread of overload) while Section
5.2 discusses other potential challenges (eg, the increased threat of regulatory
capture or collusion, the inability to compare and play supervisors against each
other).
Finally, Section 6 provides a short conclusion pointing towards the
importance of careful organizational planning in the context of the integration
process.
2 Introduction
The European ﬁnancial markets have changed rapidly over the past three
decades fuelled by deregulation and advances in information technology. These
factors have provided scope for consolidation, as reﬂected in the increasing
popularity of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinational ﬁnancial institutions.
Technological advances and deregulation have also accelerated the emergence
of new ﬁnancial products that are more diﬃcult to classify under the traditional
categories of banking, securities and insurance. All these developments have
contributed towards the growing need for the separate sectoral supervisors as
well as the diﬀerent national authorities to cooperate in the supervision of
ﬁnancial institutions. At the level of European Union, this has raised the
question of creating a supranational supervisory authority. In some individual
countries like Finland where the current system of ﬁnancial supervision is
still based on (partial) sectoral separation between the supervisors, these
developments have led to suggestions to rethink the supervisory structure.
Concentrating on the European situation, this paper uses economic
literature to discuss some of the challenges imposed on the existing supervisory
structures by the internationalization and, especially, conglomeration of the
ﬁnancial services industry in Europe. Special emphasis is put on ﬁnancial
conglomerates so as to highlight the issues related to the integration of sectoral
supervisors pushed forward in part by the increased formation of ﬁnancial
c o n g l o m e r a t e sa sw e l la st h ee m e r g e n c eo fn e wﬁnancial products that blur the
traditional distinctions between banking, securities and insurance.
Although the focus is on ﬁnancial conglomerates, looking at ﬁnancial
conglomerates and multinationals in parallel is justiﬁed for several reasons.
First, in many cases ﬁnancial conglomerates are also multinationals. Second,
apart from the removal of regulatory barriers, the economic literature on
ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinational ﬁnancial institutions identify partly
t h es a m er e a s o n sa sh a v i n gl e dﬁnancial institutions to adopt these structures.
I nt h ec a s eo fﬁnancial conglomerates, conglomeration has been motivated
by the desire of ﬁnancial institutions to capture diﬀerent types of economies
of scale and scope as well as the possibility to better diversify risk insofar
as the returns of various business lines are imperfectly correlated (for more
detailed discussion and model along these lines, see Mälkönen, 2004a,b). In
8similar vein, the formation of multinational ﬁnancial institutions has been
argued to be driven by the wish of ﬁnancial institutions to beneﬁtf r o ms c a l e
economies and improved risk diversiﬁcation where the latter is due to two
factors; the widening of the potential asset pool as well as the reduction in the
geographic concentration of the ﬁnancial activities (see Calzolari and Loranth,
2001). Third, by virtue of being simultaneously supervised by more than
one supervisory authority, multinational ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial
conglomerates subject to sectoral supervision are both common agents of
several supervisors. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of supervision these two
phenomena are also related in the sense that the corporate structure chosen
by the ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinationals plays a role in the economic
literature as well as in the political discussions surrounding the emergence of
some of the central supervisory concerns.
In this paper, I especially highlight the role of organizational form in the
supervisory process of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinationals. However,
before looking at the speciﬁc supervisory concerns of ﬁnancial conglomerates
and multinationals and their relationship to the corporate structure, I ﬁrst
outline the developments that have led to increasing pressures to reform
the current supervisory systems in Europe. After that, I discuss some key
aspects of supervision that are common both to ﬁnancial conglomerates and
multinationals. Finally, having looked at the supervisory issues raised by the
organizational form of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinationals in turn, I
examine the challenges related to the integration of sectoral supervisors which,
due to the interrelated nature of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinational
ﬁnancial institutions, also help to understand the challenges of supranational
supervision. Throughout the paper I use the Finnish situation as a reference
p o i n tt oi l l u s t r a t es o m eq u e s t i o n sr a i s e db yﬁnancial market developments
regarding the institutional structure of supervision.
3 Conglomeration and internationalization of
European ﬁnancial industry
According to the deﬁnition of Joint Forum (1999), ﬁnancial conglomerate
is an organization whose primary business is ﬁnancial and whose regulated
entities engage to a signiﬁcant extent in at least two of the activities of
banking, insurance and securities. In practice, the deﬁnition used to guide
the supervision of ﬁnancial conglomerates is often more restrictive than the
preceding rather general characterization.1
1In the case of EU, see The Financial Conglomerates Directive for more speciﬁc criteria
concerning, eg, what is to be considered as signiﬁcant engagement.
9The deﬁnition of Joint Forum allows diﬀerent combinations of banking,
insurance and securities activities to be treated as ﬁnancial conglomerates.
From the European perspective, of particular interest are so called
bancassurance groups; that is, those ﬁnancial conglomerates that combine
banking services and insurance activities.2 T h er e a s o n sa r et h r e e f o l d .
First, it is common in Europe for the banks to provide traditional banking
services and securities business in a single legal entity. This long-time practice,
often regarded as an integral part of the European universal banking tradition,
is permitted throughout the EU under the Consolidated Banking Directive
and, consequently, does not qualify as a ﬁnancial conglomerate in meaning
of the Financial Conglomerates Directive. This is in sharp contrast to the
United States which traditionally has greatly restricted the ability of banks
to engage into the securities business either directly (ie, through an in-house
department) or through a subsidiary of the bank.3 However, the enactment
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 has reduced the gap between Europe
and the United States although the Act still adopts a more restrictive view
on ﬁnancial conglomeration than the EU by directly dictating under which
corporate structures certain activities can be conducted and by limiting the
freedom of banks to own (and to be owned by) non-ﬁnancial companies.4
Second reason favoring the concentration on bancassurance groups is their
increasing popularity in Europe. Dierick (2004) estimates that the total value
of merger and acquisition activity in the banking and insurance industry
involving EU undertakings reached EUR950 billion in the period 1990—2003.
Approximately 40 per cent of this activity consisted of cross-sectoral deals.
In particular, ﬁnancial conglomeration has been a pronounced trend in
Scandinavia. For instance, seven of 50 major bancassurance groups listed in
Dierick are from Sweden and Finland. In terms of market shares in year 2001,
ﬁnancial conglomerates held 57% of deposits and 61% and 37% of premium
income in the Finnish banking, life insurance and non-life insurance markets,
respectively, giving further indication of the importance of conglomeration (see
Shoenmaker, 2006).
The third reason for focusing on bancassurance is related to the changes
in the supervisory structures of ﬁnancial markets currently taking place in
Europe. If organized in the traditional manner, a typical way to structure the
supervision of banking, insurance and securities business is to have each of
these sectors supervised by a separate supervisor. This is still the general
2Typically, bancassurance is used to refer to banks that develop insurance activities.
However, here the term is used in a broad sense to refer to the combination of banking and
insurance.
3Santos (1998) oﬀers an excellent survey on the potential advantages and disadvantages
of combining traditional banking and securities business.
4Under the the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the subsidiaries of banks are allowed to conduct
most ﬁnancial activities including much of the securities business; those activities that the
subsidiaries of banks cannot conduct can be undertaken by adopting a speciﬁcc o r p o r a t e
structure called ﬁnancial holding company which is allowed to own banks as well as all the
other providers of ﬁnancial services as its subsidiaries. As a result, some authors have used
the term ‘broad banking’ to refer to the new US legislation so as to separate it from the
less restrictive European universal banking (for more detailed discussion on these issues, see
Barth et al, 2000, and Benston, 1994).
10principle upon which the supervisory system is built for instance in the
United States. In Europe, the situation is however rapidly changing with
the tendency being towards integrated supervision. Although the Finnish
system already exhibits partial integration in the sense that banking and
securities business are supervised by a single authority called the Financial
Supervision Authority (FSA) while the supervision of insurance companies
is undertaken by another agency called the Insurance Supervision Authority
(ISA), the recent developments in ﬁnancial markets and in other countries’
supervisory structures have intensiﬁed the Finnish debate on whether the
integration of supervision should be taken one step further by creating a single
national authority responsible for the supervision of all the three sectors.
A similar type of discussion is taking place at the level of EU. However,
h e r et h ed e b a t ec o n c e r n st h ec r e a t i o no fa supranational supervisory authority
aimed at facilitating the oversight of ﬁnancial industry whose supervision at the
European level is yet in the hands of independent national supervisors although
the industry itself is becoming increasingly multinational. In particular, at the
same time as ﬁnancial conglomeration has gathered pace in Europe, there
has also been a consolidation trend in the ﬁnancial industry whereby the
providers of ﬁnancial services merge with the same sector ﬁrms not only
domestically but also across the national borders. According to Berger et
al (2000), the value of cross-border consolidation in Europe has increased
more rapidly in recent years than in the past. In fact, Berger et al (1999)
estimate that, although domestic deals still dominated in the banking industry,
in the securities and insurance industries the market value of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions involving European ﬁnancial institutions of same
sector exceeded that of domestic consolidations in the period 1985—1997. In
Scandinavia, the emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates and multinationals has
been closely related since some prominent examples of ﬁnancial conglomerates
like Nordea have extensive cross-border activities.
Reﬂecting the preceding developments in the ﬁnancial industry, supervisory
issues have become a concern also in economics. One aspect that has attracted
much attention in the recent theoretical literature (and also in the political
debate) is the role played in supervision by the corporate structure of ﬁnancial
conglomerates and multinationals. Another aspect that has raised interest is
the interaction between oﬃcial and private supervision. I will now turn to
discuss these issues.
4 Financial supervision
In this section, I ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the concept of ﬁnancial supervision
including the interplay between the oﬃcial and private supervision. After
that, I describe the relevant corporate structures for ﬁnancial conglomerates
and multinational ﬁnancial institutions and discuss some central supervisory
concerns raised by them in the light of the existing theoretical literature.
Special attention is paid to the legal framework of the EU.
114.1 Supervision of ﬁnancial institutions
As distinct from regulation, which generally refers to the rules that govern
the behavior of the providers of ﬁnancial services, supervision is the oversight
that takes place to ensure compliance with the regulatory rules (Barth et al,
2006). Typically, individual ﬁnancial institutions are subject to both oﬃcial
and private supervision. The oﬃcial supervision of individual institutions takes
place along two dimensions; prudential and conduct-of-business. The aim of
prudential supervision is to promote the safety and soundness of ﬁnancial
institutions by systemically evaluating the risk-proﬁle and risk-bearing
capacity of the supervised entities so as to ensure their solvency. The
conduct-of-business supervision, in turn, aims at protecting investors and
consumers alike by promoting a fair and transparent market process.
In some cases, ﬁnancial institutions are also supervised in aggregate. If
deﬁned as an explicit task, this type of macroprudential supervision oriented
at preserving the stability of the ﬁn a n c i a ls y s t e ma saw h o l ei st y p i c a l l y
undertaken by the central bank. Examples of central banks with this explicit
duty are the Bank of England and, outside Europe, the US Federal Reserve
while Bundesbank (and the Bank of Finland for that matter) is an example of
central bank without an explicitly deﬁned role as the guarantor of the stability
of the ﬁnancial system. However, central banks around the world have the
general task of promoting ﬁnancial stability. As a result, Bundesbank (as
well as the Bank of Finland) is expected to contribute toward eﬃcient and
harmonized operation of payment system and, to this end, has the need to
conduct also macro-level analysis and surveillance of ﬁnancial markets (for
more on this topic, see Koskenkylä and Koskinen, 2004, and Vives, 2001).
To fulﬁll their supervisory duties, the oﬃcial supervisors have access to
various supervisory powers. A characteristic feature of banking and insurance
industry is that the operation of banks and insurance companies is regulated
among other things through an authorization process. In terms of the
diﬀerent supervisory powers, the power that has attracted most attention in
the recent economic literature is the ability of a supervisor to grant and, in
particular, to withdraw the license of a ﬁnancial institution. Other typical
supervisory powers include for example the ability to conduct oﬀ-site and
on-site examinations and to impose sanctions and ﬁnes for non-compliance.5
5For a listing of the typical supervisory powers, see Martínez and Rose (2003). For
more general discussion on the relationship between statutory supervisory powers and their
eﬀectiveness and enforcement, see for example Barth et al (2006).
12Apart from the oﬃcial supervision, ﬁnancial institutions are also subject
to other forms of supervision through internal controls, auditing, ratings,
self-regulation and monitoring by stakeholders (such as debt and equity
holders). Some economists have argued that oﬃcial supervision should, in fact,
be subordinate to private supervision. That is, the role of oﬃcial supervision
should be to create an environment conducive to eﬀective private supervision,
generally referred to as market discipline, by ensuring information disclosure
(in accurate form) by ﬁnancial institutions.6
In terms of international banking regulation and supervision, the
importance of private supervision is reﬂected to some extent on the revised
Basel II Capital Accord which, in contrast to its predecessor, includes market
discipline as one of its three pillars although capital ratios still receive the
overwhelming majority of the attention. However, insofar as imposed common
standards on capital ratios are considered as reliable measures of economic
capital adequacy, they will allow market participants to better assess and
compare the creditworthiness of banks both cross-sectionally and across time.
Consequently, Basel II with its regulatory standards for minimum capital
requirements may serve to further market discipline also in a more indirect
way (for more on this, see Gordy and Howells, 2006).
In principle, market discipline may both complement oﬃcial supervision
and provide some advantages over it. Potential advantages include the
aggregation of information from numerous market participants as well as the
ability to shift the burden of proof to the ﬁnancial institution that needs
to demonstrate it is not excessively risky to the markets. Market discipline
could also complement oﬃcial supervision in that the pricing of risk-sensitive
debt instruments could be considered in setting deposit insurance premiums
or in triggering supervisory action like on-site examination.7 Adopting the
viewpoint that information contained in securities prices could be used to
complement oﬃcial supervision Lehar et al (2005) argue that, by being able
to use market information to target auditing on bad banks, supervisory
authorities could beneﬁt from incorporating market information into the
supervisory process especially in good times.
In practice, the use of risk-sensitive debt instruments is considered to be
an eﬀective way to promote market discipline both through the instruments’
issuance market and their secondary market. Although not the only instrument
capable of providing market discipline, subordinated notes and debentures are
usually seen as particularly attractive for disciplinary purposes due to three
reasons: they are among the ﬁrst liabilities to lose value in the event of failure
(in particular, a bailout in the case of failure is considered as highly unlikely),
they do not beneﬁt from any upside of excessive risk-taking thus creating an
incentive for investors to monitor and limit risk-taking, and, thirdly, they have
6See Barth et al (2006) for this view; for the concept of market discipline as well as
discussion of the market-based banking supervision system of New Zealand, see Llewellyn
and Mayes (2003) and Mayes (2000), respectively.
7For the supervisory authorities to beneﬁt from market information, the market does not
have to be better informed than the authorities; rather, the parties just have to respond to
diﬀerent information. In this case, the supervisors may beneﬁt from incorporating market
information into their own assessments.
13a relatively long maturity diminishing the ability of investors to withdraw their
funds and run.8
To shed some light (among other things) on the relationship of market
discipline to oﬃcial regulatory and supervisory tools, I will next turn to discuss
the relevant corporate structures of ﬁnancial conglomerates as these structures
form the context in which the supervisory issues have been analyzed in the
recent theoretical literature. Simultaneously I also discuss the speciﬁcs of the
supervision of ﬁnancial conglomerates within the EU.
4.2 Supervision and corporate structure of ﬁnancial
conglomerates
In the prudential supervision of regulated entities there are three layers
within the legal framework of the EU all of which can be present in the
supervision of a ﬁnancial conglomerate. First, the individual regulated entities
are supervised on a stand-alone or solo basis. Second, regulated entities
forming a group active in the same sector of the ﬁnancial industry are subject
to consolidated or supplementary supervision. This type of consolidated
supervision is well established for banking groups while insurance groups
are subject to a more limited supplementary supervision. The Financial
Conglomerates Directive deals with the supervision of the third layer; ie, the
supplementary supervision of heterogeneous ﬁnancial services groups active in
several ﬁnancial sectors. The Financial Conglomerates Directive is based on so
called solo-plus approach. It takes as its starting point the solo supervision of
individually regulated entities and complements it by a group-wide assessment.
It also introduces a coordinator which is the competent authority assigned the
responsibility to exercise and coordinate the supplementary supervision when
several sectoral supervisors are involved or the conglomerate has cross-border
activities (for an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Dierick, 2004, and
Gruson, 2004).
Within this general supervisory framework, the ﬁnancial conglomerates
can provide ﬁnancial services through various corporate structures. As the
existing literature is systematically bank-oriented, I concentrate here on the
four main organizational ways for a bank to extend its scope of activities
into the securities business and insurance.9 Under the ﬁrst structure, all the
ﬁnancial services are provided within a single corporate structure supported by
a single capital base. Although called somewhat misleadingly as the German
8A variety of proposals has been put forward as to what characteristics subordinated debt
programs should have (eg, should the issuance of subordinated debt be mandatory, what
type of institutions should be subject to it, who (in the case of bank-holding companies)
should issue it, what amount of assets should be funded through it, how regularly issuance
should occur etc.). For a general discussion on these issues, see the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System Staﬀ Study (1999); for a model where compulsory issuance of
subordinated debt may allow to reduce minimum capital requirement, see Decamps et al
(2004).
9This section on corporate structures draws heavily on Dierick (2004), Herring and
Santomero (1990), Vander Vennet (2002) and Walter (1997).
14universal bank, no actual bank conforms to this type of fully-integrated
structure (combining banking, securities activities and insurance as in-house
departments) once insurance activities are included. In particular, while
it is possible in Europe to conduct banking and securities business within
a single legal entity, such a structure is not possible when the scope of
activities is extended to also cover insurance. In fact, combining insurance
with banking, securities or any other commercial business in the same legal
entity is prohibited by law. This same separation applies also to the diﬀerent
types of insurance activities which should be undertaken in distinct entities.
In terms of the degree of integration between the activities, the ‘next-best
solution’ is then partial integration; ie, to undertake commercial and
investment banking within the same entity, and to conduct the separately
regulated insurance activity through a separately capitalized subsidiary. The
third option is to conduct both securities activities and insurance as the
subsidiaries of the parent bank. The model entailing the most extensive
legal separateness between the activities is the holding company model under
which each of the activities of banking, securities business and insurance
is undertaken via a separately capitalized subsidiary of a holding company.
Excluding the fully-integrated model, all the other three models are possible
in Europe while the United States is more restrictive banning also partial
integration.
In principle, the preceding corporate structures insulate the diﬀerent
ﬁnancial activities from the outcomes of the other activities to a diﬀerent
degree. In fact, due to the cushioning eﬀect of the holding company that,
in contrast to the bank-parent model, makes the relationship between the
bank and the other units only indirect, the perceived better insulation
of banking activities from the potential problems in nonbank aﬃliates
together with the perceived improved easiness of limiting safety net coverage
to the traditional banking activities, have importantly directed the US
regulatory decision-making to favor the holding-company structure. This
has led holding-company to be the predominant corporate structure in the
United States while in countries, which allow more freedom to choose the
organizational form, the banks typically conduct securities activities in-house
and insurance activities in subsidiaries (Herring and Santomero, 1990, and
Santos, 1998). However, whether (as is generally argued) a bank’s incentives
to bail out a failing nonbank unit are really decreased when the unit is an
aﬃliate rather than a subsidiary, remains an open question.10 Consequently,
the actual eﬀective diﬀerences between the alternative corporate structures
tend in practice to be less clear-cut especially since a ﬁnancial institution
corresponding to a certain legal structure may also itself engage into voluntary
(ie, self-imposed) ring-fencing and ﬁrewall arrangements to operationally
isolate diﬀerent units from each other (Herring and Santomero, 1990, and
10According to a former chairman of a large American bank, it is inconceivable that any
major bank would walk away from any subsidiary of its holding company since, despite legal
separateness, markets do not generally perceive the units as independent (Santos, 1998).
To limit the reputational losses associated with an aﬃliate’s failure in a holding-company
structure, the separateness of aﬃliates is sometimes accentuated by requiring ﬁrewalls such
as that an aﬃliate diﬀer from the bank name (Herring and Santomero, 1990).
15Song, 2004).11
Building on the idea that the corporate structure of ﬁnancial conglomerate
may aﬀect the degree of isolation between diﬀerent activities, Freixas et al
(2006) develop a stylized model where a ﬁnancial conglomerate can adopt one
of two structures; a holding-company structure or an integrated structure.
Under the holding-company structure, the ﬁnancial conglomerate consists of a
deposit ﬁnanced entity (whose debt holders, called as depositors, have access
to deposit insurance) and of a non-deposit ﬁnanced entity with each of these
entities having a separate capital base and, consequently, also a separate capital
requirement. In the integrated structure these entities are combined under a
single capital base subject to a single capital requirement which, in contrast to
the holding-company structure, introduces a joint liability between the entities.
Due to this built-in bailing-out policy, the integrated structure is able to proﬁt
from diversiﬁcation beneﬁts since a failure of an investment project in one
entity can be cancelled out by a successful project in the other entity; under
the holding-company structure these beneﬁts are lost because the entities fail
independently.
A central supervisory concern raised in context of ﬁnancial conglomerates is
the possibility of regulatory arbitrage which refers to the risk that investment
projects are transferred within the conglomerate structure from one entity
to another so as to take advantage of potentially lower capital requirements.
One of the main insights of the model by Freixas et al is that, although
a holding-company ﬁnancial conglomerate is unable to access diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts and, due to the separate capital requirements, is able to engage into
regulatory arbitrage, such a structure can nevertheless be socially optimal
(and even dominate an integrated structure) if capital requirements are
set appropriately.12 This necessitates that the capital requirement for the
holding-company bank is set above that of the non-deposit ﬁnanced entity so
as to take advantage of diﬀerences in market discipline and, in contrast to
the conventional wisdom, to encourage regulatory arbitrage (ie, the shifting of
11The eﬀective diﬀerences may also get blurred by the actions of the regulators. In the
United States the regulators have for example attempted to introduce a so-called source of
strength doctrine according to which the holding-company has a duty to act as a source
of ﬁnancial strength to its banking subsidiary. The aim is to simulate the bank-parent
model where, if the bank gets into ﬁnancial trouble, the bank’s creditors can claim the
assets of the subsidiaries (as the capital of these units is an asset of the bank) while in the
holding-company model the capital is an asset of the holding-company and, hence, beyond
the reach of the bank’s creditors (Santos, 1998).
12However, one should be careful in interpreting this result as evidence of the superiority of
the holding-company structure as compared to the other alternative models of conglomerate
structure. In particular, interpreting the non-deposit ﬁnanced entity as an insurance
company is only possible if the conglomerate adopts the holding-company structure.
Furthermore, interpreting the integrated structure as a ﬁnancial conglomerate where banking
and securities business are conducted under a single capital base is questionable for two
reasons. First, under the current EU legislation, such a combination is considered as
a homogeneous ﬁnancial group and, consequently, it does not fall under the Financial
Conglomerates Directive. Second, it is not possible to combine banking and securities
business in such a way in the United States. As a result, in contrast to being a comparison
between two forms of ﬁnancial conglomerates, the model is (under the current European
and US legislation) in essence a comparison between a traditional European-style universal
bank and a holding-company ﬁnancial conglomerate.
16projects from the bank to the other division).13
Interestingly, the results of Freixas et al suggest that strict enough market
discipline may justify the setting of capital ratio for the non-deposit ﬁnanced
entity to zero, thus making oﬃcial regulation and, consequently, also oﬃcial
supervision partly unnecessary. In context of insurance markets, similar
result is also reached by Rees et al (1999) who show that, if consumers
are fully informed about the risk of insurer’s insolvency, capital regulation
is redundant since insurers will never risk being insolvent. Rees et al then
argue that the primary function of oﬃcial regulation and supervision should
be information provision and, only secondarily, capital regulation. In banking,
similar conclusion emphasizing the priority of concentrating on information
dissemination in the supervision process is made by Demirgüç-Kunt et al
(2006) who show that bank soundness is substantially improved by compliance
with the information provision principles of Eﬀective Banking Supervision
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
As a ﬁnal remark before moving to the analysis of multinational ﬁnancial
institutions, there tends to be skepticism as to whether deposit insurance has
such a substantial eﬀect on market discipline as Freixas et al seem to suggest.
In particular, it is argued that the small (retail) depositors whose deposits are
insured are unlikely to do any monitoring anyway. This view is based on the
idea that small depositors, who generally are the primary holders of bank debt,
are too unsophisticated and dispersed to have either the understanding or the
incentive to perform monitoring. In fact, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) argue
under their representation hypothesis that regulation in the form of a private
or public representative is motivated in particular by the need to protect these
small depositors.
4.3 Supervision and organizational structure of multinational
ﬁnancial institutions
In this section, I consider the supervision of multinational ﬁnancial institutions,
especially banks, in the EU. Before discussing the essential principle aﬀecting
the supervision of multinational banks, namely the principle of home country
control, I introduce the main organizational forms for multinational banking.
There are several forms under which multinational banking can be
undertaken. These organizational forms diﬀer in the extent of activities they
allow the bank to conduct abroad. Ranked in order of increasing foreign
involvement, these forms are correspondent banking, representative oﬃces,
agencies, branches and subsidiaries. While only a limited range of banking
13In Freixas et al, the debt holders of the non-deposit ﬁnanced entity are assumed to
exercise perfect market discipline while the depositors are discouraged from exercising it
because deposit insurance insulates them from any potential losses. These diﬀerences in
market discipline then make it optimal to set the capital requirements so as to encourage the
transfer of projects to the entity where risk is priced appropriately (ie, increased risk-taking
leads to higher cost of funds). For a model, where market discipline is reduced not because
of deposit insurance but because diversiﬁcation diminishes the sensitivity of the aggregate
cash ﬂow to the investment decisions of individual divisions, see Boot and Schmeits (2000).
17activities in the foreign market is allowed under the ﬁrst three structures, a
full range of activities is typically available for a branch and subsidiary (for a
detailed discussion about the allowed activities under each of these forms, see
Curry et al, 2003).
Notwithstanding the similarities in the extent of permitted activities,
foreign branches diﬀer from foreign subsidiaries in terms of supervision due to
the diﬀerences in the authorization process. In particular, in contrast to foreign
subsidiaries which are basically considered as local banks and, consequently,
r e q u i r es e p a r a t ea u t h o r i z a t i o nb yt h eh o s tc o u n t r yo ﬃcials, foreign branches
are extensions of the home country bank and, as such, do not require further
authorization. As a result, based on the principle of home country control
which, as a central principle of supervision in the EU, allocates the supervision
of solvency in the hands of the oﬃcials of the country where the bank has been
authorized, foreign branches are supervised by the home country oﬃcials while
subsidiaries are supervised by the host country.14
In eﬀect, the branch structure creates a single European passport by
enabling a bank authorized in one EU country to oﬀer ﬁnancial services in
the other EU countries, provided of course that the bank has been authorized
to oﬀer such services in the home country. The access to this passport is,
however, conditional on the choice of branch structure. An interesting feature
of the European cross-border banking is that it often takes place in the form
of subsidiaries although, in contrast to branch structure, this necessitates a
separate authorization by the host country oﬃcials and, as a result, increases
the regulatory burden (for an interesting discussion about this topic, see
Dermine, 2002). Loranth and Morrison (2003) argue that this phenomenon
may result from the desire of banks to avoid a potential underinvestment
problem caused by the inherent bailing out policy of branch structure that
reduces the value of deposit insurance subsidy and, consequently, may lead
a bank with branch structure to set an ineﬃciently high hurdle rate for its
investment.15
Insofar as legal impediments have played a role in directing the choice of
organizational structure, the European Company Statute aimed at enabling
companies established in more than one European Union member state to
merge and operate under a single set of rules may well prove to have an
important eﬀect on the structure in which cross-border banking is carried
out in the future. In this respect, an interesting example is Nordea which is
planning to take advantage of the European Company Statute and replace its
current subsidiary-based banking operations in several Nordic countries with
a branch structure headquartered in Sweden. However, there still remains
open legislative issues outside the scope of the European Company Statute
concerning for instance the organization of deposit insurance which under
14However, even in the case of foreign subsidiaries the consolidated supervision is the
responsibility of the home country oﬃcials. The home country principle also applies to
deposit insurance which, in the case of foreign branches, is provided by the home country.
15Under the branch structure, the branches and the parent institution are jointly liable
for any losses. Under the subsidiary structure, the parent institution is not liable for the
failure of a subsidiary but can (at least in principle) walk away from a failing subsidiary so
as to extract the full value of deposit insurance safety net.
18the planned new structure should at least in principle be entirely provided
by Sweden. Especially, the diﬃculties associated with withdrawing and
transferring contributions from the existing national deposit insurance schemes
is identiﬁed as one factor slowing down the transition to the branch structure
(on the Nordea case, see Mayes, 2005).
Taken together, a characteristic feature of the current supervisory
framework of multinational ﬁnancial institutions in Europe is decentralized
supervision which means that multinational ﬁnancial institutions are
simultaneously supervised by several national authorities. This has raised
the question of strategic interaction between the home and host country
authorities among the central issues in the literature on multinational banking
supervision.16
The paper by Holthausen and Rønde (2005) illustrates one of the central
supervisory concerns related to multinational banks in a framework where the
supervisory authorities may intervene in the operation of a multinational bank
by closing it down. Holthausen and Rønde concentrate on a multinational
bank which conducts its foreign operations through a branch. In this case, the
consolidated supervision as well as the decision of whether to close the bank
down are in the hands of the home country supervisor. Holthausen and Rønde
show that, if the two countries are diﬀerently aﬀected by the closure decision,
the self-interested national supervisors who only care about their own national
welfare do not agree upon the closure decision which leads the host country
supervisor to withhold some of its supervisory information. As a result, the
ﬁrst best closure decision is not achieved.17
The model by Holthausen and Rønde highlights one of the central
supervisory concerns related to the principle of home country control; namely
that the incentives of national supervisors to acquire or share information
m a yb ea d v e r s e l ya ﬀected by the allocation of the ultimate supervisory
responsibility included in this principle.18 In practice, one factor causing
diﬀerences in the way that the countries are aﬀected by closure decisions and,
as a result, potentially acting as an impediment to information acquisition or
ﬂow between the supervisors is that the multinational ﬁnancial institutions
may not be of same systemic importance in all countries. In Finland, systemic
concerns related to the ability of the authorities to achieve eﬀective and timely
supervisory decisions have been raised in the context of Nordea, which plays
a more important role in the Finnish ﬁnancial markets than in Sweden, but
has plans (as was discussed above) to replace its subsidiary-based banking
16For a general discussion on the problems of home country control, see for example Enria
and Vesala (2003) and Mayes and Vesala (1998).
17In a related paper, Repullo (2001) shows that lack of coordination among national
supervisors may lead the domestic supervisor to apply softer closure policy to a multinational
bank with branch structure than to a national bank. Calzolari and Loranth (2006), in turn,
demonstrate that the organizational structure of multinational bank (branch or subsidiary)
may cause diﬀerences in the intervention and information acquisition policies of the home and
host country supervisors. However, neither of these papers considers strategic information
exchange between the separate authorities.
18On the regulatory side, an analogous concern is that decentralized regulation may lead
to a race to the bottom in capital standards. For a model along these lines, see Acharya
(2003) and Dalen and Olsen (2003).
19structure in Finland by a branch structure to be supervised dominantly by the
Swedish authorities instead of the Finnish ones.19
Conﬂict of interest between national authorities may also be triggered by
the diﬀering weights these authorities put on factors like the soundness or
proﬁtability of the banking sector. By taking this approach, Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2005) analyze capital regulation among competing national
regulators. In the process of doing this, they raise an important question.
What would it take for the national regulators to prefer centralized (ie,
supranational) regulation? I know turn to this question of integration of
supervision so as to analyze some of the challenges related to it. Although the
viewpoint will predominantly be one of ﬁnancial conglomerates, understanding
the concerns raised by the integration of sectoral supervisors also helps to shed
some light on the potential challenges posed by the integration of supervision
at the European level.
5 Integration of sectoral supervisors
Until recently, the supervision of ﬁnancial institutions at national level has
been based in many European countries on the sectoral model of supervision.
In this model, there are separate supervisors for banking, securities business
and insurance. However, cross-sector arrangements for supervision in the form
of functional or integrated model have increasingly gained popularity. In the
functional model, there are separate supervisors for the prudential supervision
and the conduct of business supervision across the sectors. The underlining
principle for the organization of supervision is thus the objective of supervision.
For example in the Netherlands, the current supervisory system allocates the
prudential supervision in all the three sectors to an authority distinct from
the authority responsible for the conduct of business supervision in all the
three sectors. In the integrated model, in turn, there is a single supervisor
for banking, insurance and securities combined. Expect for Finland, having
a single supervisor conducting prudential and conduct of business supervision
across the sectors is the typical supervisory arrangement in the Scandinavian
countries.20
Several reasons have been put forward so as to justify the integration of
supervision at national level. One of the leading reasons is related to the
emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates and the increasing need for the sectoral
supervisors to cooperate and coordinate their actions so as to ensure that these
institutions are supervised comprehensively enough. Another set of arguments
is related to the possibility to reap economies of scale and scope by integration.
19In context of ﬁnancial conglomerates, there has been a similar type of concern with
respect to the supervisory objectives of diﬀerent supervisors since in insurance and securities
supervision consumer and investor protection typically are of great concern, whereas in
banking supervision systemic risk considerations play a central role.
20Whatever way supervision is organized, the institutional structure of supervision is
a second order issue in the sense that the conditions for eﬀective supervision (ie, clear
objectives, independence, accountability, adequate resources and enforcement powers)
should ﬁrst be in place; for discussion on this, see Abrams and Taylor (2000).
20These include among other things the possibility to operate under a single
management, the opportunity to avoid duplication of monitoring costs and the
possibility to prevent a moral hazard in teams problem whereby the agencies
blame each other in case something goes wrong. Furthermore, integration
may also enable the industry to enjoy economies of scope to the extent
that integrated supervision simpliﬁes reporting, allows ‘one-stop-shopping’ and
reduces costs of supervision which in some cases (eg, in Finland) are paid by
the industry.
In principle, there are alternative means to facilitate cooperation and
coordination in supervision without establishing an integrated supervisory
authority. One such vehicle (both within and between countries) is
memorandum of understanding which is a formal agreement between
independent authorities setting out their respective supervisory tasks and
responsibilities. However, a typical feature of these agreements is that they are
legally non-binding. Other proposed solutions to enhance information sharing
between sectoral supervisors include mutual board representation, introduction
of formal consultation procedures and the establishment of cross-sectoral
committees. Generally, there is scepticism whether these mechanisms are
suﬃcient for cooperation especially if some of the information is conﬁdential
(ie, cannot be freely exchanged between independent authorities).
At the international level, the harmonization of regulatory and supervisory
policies functions as a coordination device in the absence of a supranational
authority by basically tying up the hands of various national authorities.
However, for the harmonization to be an eﬀective tool it has to be
comprehensive enough; otherwise, as Acharya (2003) demonstrates, any
beneﬁts from cross-border standardization of regulatory policies like capital
ratios can be undone by competing national authorities unless central
supervisory policies such as closure policies are standardized as well. As a
result, less than full step towards complete coordination can be more harmful
than no step at all.
Diversiﬁcation of business lines by ﬁnancial institutions contrasts sharply
with the trend of deconglomeration in other industries. As supervisory
structures should be robust to changes in the composition of ﬁnancial
institutions, this has called in question the sensibility of integrating supervision
after all since ﬁnancial institutions may posit on less diversiﬁcation in the
future. Whether this trend of conglomeration will turn out to be a long-lasting
phenomenon in the ﬁnancial markets, there are nevertheless further reasons
(most prominently the emergence of new ﬁnancial products) that favor and
require tight cooperation of supervisors. For instance, new types of securities
products such as credit derivatives share in practice many similarities with an
insurance product (Briault, 1999). Consequently, as the development of new
ﬁnancial products has blurred the distinctions between traditional industry
lines making it more diﬃcult for supervisory authorities to classify products
by the type intermediary, the case for increased cooperation in supervision
does not rest entirely on the popularity of ﬁnancial conglomerates.
21The integration of sectoral supervisors poses challenges as well. In what
follows, I will outline some of these by broadly categorizing them into
multitasking-based and non-multitasking based challenges.
5.1 Multitasking-based challenges for integrated supervision
As a by-product of integration, a plurality of tasks gets allocated to a single
authority. This may give rise to several problems. First, some of these tasks
m i g h tb ei nc o n ﬂict with each other. This concern is sometimes used to justify
why supervision should not be integrated to the central bank although there
might be synergies (informational economies of scope) between supervision and
the conduct of central bank’s other tasks. For example, it is feared that an
initiative by the central bank to promote the proﬁtability of a troubled ﬁnancial
sector might conﬂict the aim of price stability. In accordance with this view,
Di Noia and Di Giorgio (1999) ﬁnd that allocating banking supervision to the
central bank leads to higher and more volatile inﬂation rates. Furthermore,
Kahn and Santos (2005) argue in a multitasking framework that allocating
bank supervisory powers to the lender of last resort which typically is the
central bank is conducive to excessive forbearance (ie, too few bank closures
taking place); this can be improved upon by giving the supervisory powers to
the provider of deposit insurance instead.21 A related, although not necessarily
central bank speciﬁc concern is that a desire to acquire reputation as a capable
supervisor might lead to lax attitude and excessive passivity in intervention
so that bank closures will not put the authority’s supervisory capacity in
question (for a model along these lines, see Boot and Thakor, 1993). Arguably
much for this reason prompt corrective action (PCA) requiring mandatory
regulatory intervention for undercapitalized institutions was introduced in the
United States in 1991. To limit supervisory forbearance, it is also sometimes
suggested that the potentially conﬂicting tasks of supervision and intervention
(ie, withdrawal of operating licence) should be separated (for discussion on
this, see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993).
Second, a multiplicity of tasks may introduce problems with incentive
provision if performance on some tasks is less easily measured. In this setting,
providing incentive pay on the measurable task tends to distort the eﬀort
against the activities whose results are less measurable (see Holmström and
Milgrom, 1991). Consequently, the use of high-powered incentives may be
precluded. The incentive provision problem is even more compounded if, as
t h er e s u l to ft h ei n t e g r a t i o n ,t h em i s s i o no ft h ea g e n c yi ss ob r o a da st ob e c o m e
21However, this solution may lead to the neglect of investors’ interests and market
discipline if the provider of deposit insurance sees the protection of deposit insurance fund
as its primary duty. In particular, Eisenbeis (2004) points out that the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States resisted for years the disclosure of
even most basic ﬁnancial information on banks out of fear that accurate information might
trigger a run on ﬁnancial institutions and lead to losses to the deposit insurance fund. The
separation of monetary and supervisory powers may also weaken the accuracy of central
bank’s macroeconomic forecasts by preventing the central bank to access conﬁdential bank
supervisory information (see Peek et al, 1999).
22‘fuzzy’. Since broadening the mission makes the market evaluation of the
oﬃcials’ talent more diﬃcult, alternative measures like career concerns become
less eﬃcient in inducing the oﬃcials to exert eﬀort (for the incentive costs of
the pursuance of multiple goals by agencies, see for example Dewatripont et
al, 1999).
Finally, since the integration of supervision is typically accompanied with
a move to single management, the resulting multiplicity of tasks may cause
overload problems in monitoring if such a move is associated with resource
cuts and the monitoring ability of individuals is limited (ie, it is increasingly
costly for an individual to monitor an increasing number of projects). This
problem can manifest itself as an internal problem whereby the capability of
upper hierarchical levels of the supervisory agency to oversee the lower ones
gets more limited or as an external problem entailing limitations in the ability
of the supervisory authority to monitor the industry (of course, these problems
a r ei n t e r r e l a t e di nt h es e n s et h a tt h eﬁrst one can give rise to the second one).
5.2 Other challenges
One argument sometimes raised in favour of integrated supervision is that,
since it creates a larger supervisory entity, it could alleviate the threat
of regulatory capture; that is, it could function against the threat that
regulatory and supervisory policies get driven by the desires of powerful interest
groups like the industry. Interestingly, Laﬀont and Martimort (1999) however
argue that the integration of supervisors may actually increase the threat of
regulatory capture by enabling a self-interested supervisor to have a larger
scope to enter into collusive agreements with the industry thanks to the
monopoly in the acquisition of supervisory information. Prevention of collusive
behavior then establishes a potential case for the separation of supervisors.
Yet another argument for keeping the supervisors separated comes from
the possibility to play supervisory agencies against each other (this is a
variant of the yardstick competition argument put forward by Shleifer, 1985).
However, as Maskin et al (2000) argue, the possibility to capture the beneﬁts
of yardstick competition does not necessarily require keeping the supervisors
separate. In particular, in an integrated agency the beneﬁts of relative
performance evaluation could be captured through organizational design by
choosing the multidivisional structure (M-form) over the unitary structure
(U-form).22 Note that this argument establishes an interesting analogy
between the organizational design of the corporations to be supervised and
that of the supervisor; in both cases, the organizational structure seems to
play a role in the emergence of supervisory challenges.
22When applied to the design of integrated banking and insurance supervisor, this implies
for instance that the prudential supervision of banking and insurance sectors should be
undertaken not in the same but in separate divisions.
236C o n c l u s i o n s
Ak e yf e a t u r eo ft h ec h a n g e st h a th a v et a k e np l a c ei nt h eE u r o p e a nﬁnancial
markets is a substantial increase in the interdependence of diﬀerent sectors of
ﬁnancial markets as well as countries. This has raised the question whether
a decentralized supervisory framework is equipped to handle the challenges of
ongoing further integration and structural change.
However, as discussed in this paper, a move to integrated supervision is
likely to posit challenges of its own. An inherent characteristic of integrated
supervision is the monopoly position of single authority in the supervision of
ﬁnancial industry. Consequently, careful consideration and design is needed
to ensure the eﬀective functioning of integrated supervision as such a move
necessarily results to a situation where a plurality of tasks gets allocated to a
single authority giving rise to several potential multi-tasking related challenges.
In particular, it is important for a multitasking organization to have a clear
sense of mission for the integration process not to lead to unintended negative
consequences like the demoralization of staﬀ or departure of experienced
personnel.23 The design of the objective is also central so as to prevent one
agency’s approach to supervision from becoming overly dominant over that of
the other agencies especially if, at the outset of the integration process, one of
t h ea g e n c i e so u t n u m b e r st h eo t h e r si nt e r m so fs t a ﬀ or resources. Otherwise,
the integration process may threaten the recognition of industry-speciﬁc
characteristics and expertise in supervision. Similar concern of course applies
to the design of infrastructure like the existence of adequate and up-to-date
legislation and suﬃcient budgetary resources as well as operational systems
(IT in particular). Failure to account for these challenges may unnecessarily
complicate and prolong the transition process making it more diﬃcult to
achieve desired improvements in the eﬀectiveness of supervision.
23In a study of integrated supervisory agencies, Martínez and Rose (2003) found that
these two problems were commonly encountered in establishing integrated agencies.
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